3.1.4 The politics of tipping-point governance

Several political dynamics will accompany the development of governance institutions related to climate tipping points. While many of these are unpredictable, the following are likely to emerge, especially in the early phase of agenda setting and governance venue identification.

Governance of ESTPs is currently in the agenda-setting phase, where the provision of knowledge needs to be accelerated and diversified, attention needs to be created and existing institutions need to be engaged in conversations about governance venues and priority topics. Science-policy interactions, policy and institutional entrepreneurs, and certain international organisations like UNEP, the WMO and the IEA can play a critical role in this phase, constructing shared knowledge and concern, and building momentum towards discussions and meetings. 

Another key actor with the power to galvanise action on new topics through speeches and convening power is the UN Secretary General (Johnstone, 2003). For example, the UNSG could establish a high-level forum, science advisory panel, or similar initiative to foster immediate engagement with ESTPs across the UN system. 

Importantly, in this phase different meanings of the concept of ESTPs are created through the interactions between scientific and political actors. Different interpretations and understandings of the problem will lead to different proposals for its solution and corresponding priorities for governance, dividing some actors and aligning others. As with the climate agenda generally, we should expect deliberate resistance and disinformation as well as genuine diversity on interpretations of tipping points rooted in cultural and epistemic differences. Governance mechanisms should seek to anticipate this and enable inclusion of diversity while resisting bad-faith interventions.

To the extent that a deeper understanding of ESTPs unite and mobilise new groups of actors, for example those with a shared regional interest in preventing certain tipping elements (e.g. the Arctic, or actors with livelihoods that depend on a thriving rainforest), new political coalitions may emerge that could differ from the well-established groups and their relationships in the regime complex for climate change. In some instances, existing actors might be reinforced in their shared positions, such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). When AOSIS was formed more than 30 years ago, the concept of climate tipping points did not exist. Today, especially tipping points that can affect the speed and degree of sea level rise (e.g. the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets) have major implications for small islands’ climate vulnerability and are likely to strengthen the group’s identity and interests. In other cases, tipping points might lead to alliances between state and non-state actors.

The possibility of new actors emerging or existing actors adopting tipping-related positions also applies in various national and regional (e.g. European) contexts of climate policymaking. New alliances may try to shape domestic, regional and international policy to mitigate the impacts of tipping, in particular if they represent the interests of constituencies who will be negatively impacted by certain tipping points or by the immediate impacts of efforts to prevent tipping (Aklin and Mildenberger, 2020). Earth System tipping thus opens the possibility for new interest groups and actor coalitions to form, which could set in motion new political dynamics domestically and internationally.

In this context, the key task for the multitude of potential governance actors for ESTPs, including national and sub-national governments, international organisations, non-state actors, business actors, etc, consists of developing a sufficiently detailed understanding of ESTPs that allows them to assess the risks they present to the communities they represent. This understanding forms the foundation of each actor’s political interests, goals and strategies for engaging in governance processes. It is also a pre-condition for identifying partners with shared interests and forming coalitions. Raising interest in and creating political momentum for addressing specific tipping points – or the phenomenon of tipping points in general – will depend on the affected countries’ status in the negotiations, and their ability to influence other parties and negotiation groups.

Different countries and political actors will care more about certain tipping points than others depending on the extent to which they expect to be impacted. Countries that expect to experience impacts of ESTPs in the near future (e.g. countries with tropical coral reefs or hosting a part of the Amazon rainforest) will likely be more interested in developing prevention measures, especially by increasing mitigation ambition globally, than countries without obvious or direct expected impacts. National-scale factors, such as changes in political leadership, will play a big role in shaping a country’s interests in tipping points, as the cases of Australia (Great Barrier Reef) and Brazil (Amazon rainforest) demonstrate. Mirroring existing patterns of climate politics, major emitters or beneficiaries of greenhouse gases are more likely to resist efforts to increase the speed and scale of mitigation. While the urgency of ensuring that we do not cross critical thresholds strengthens the case for rapid transformations to just and sustainable futures, actors with a vested interest in the status quo might – and already do – predictably engage with the topic of tipping points using an increasingly well-understood repertoire of delay and obstruction tactics (Lamb et al., 2020) to obscure or avoid engaging with needed structural changes, social challenges and environmental justice.

This includes the strategic creation and distribution of mis- and disinformation, sowing doubts regarding the science of ESTPs and shaping public opinion to prevent the passing of policy response measures. The long time horizons and non-linearity of many tipping elements invite arguments that these are not the most pressing issues of the day, that anticipated impacts are exaggerated, while scientific uncertainties can be exploited to advocate for more knowledge rather than action. At the same time, actors can use climate tipping points to spread fatalistic ideas that also inhibit effective responses. Fatalists would (and already do) argue that preventive action regarding tipping processes is pointless because massive impacts are already inevitable. Since these tactics of delay and disempowerment can be anticipated, it is possible to attempt ‘public inoculation’ and ‘prebunking’ against misinformation (Lewandowsky and van der Linden, 2021).