Harmful tipping points in the natural world pose some of the gravest threats faced by humanity. Their triggering will severely damage our planet’s life-support systems and threaten the stability of our societies.
In the Summary Report:
• Narrative summary
• Global tipping points infographic
• Key messages
• Key Recommendations
Executive summary
• Section 1
• Section 2
• Section 3
• Section 4
This report is for all those concerned with tackling escalating Earth system change and mobilising transformative social change to alter that trajectory, achieve sustainability and promote social justice.
In this section:
• Foreword
• Introduction
• Key Concepts
• Approach
• References
Considers Earth system tipping points. These are reviewed and assessed across the three major domains of the cryosphere, biosphere and circulation of the oceans and atmosphere. We then consider the interactions and potential cascades of Earth system tipping points, followed by an assessment of early warning signals for Earth system tipping points.
Considers tipping point impacts. First we look at the human impacts of Earth system tipping points, then the potential couplings to negative tipping points in human systems. Next we assess the potential for cascading and compounding systemic risk, before considering the potential for early warning of impact tipping points.
Considers how to govern Earth system tipping points and their associated risks. We look at governance of mitigation, prevention and stabilisation then we focus on governance of impacts, including adaptation, vulnerability and loss and damage. Finally, we assess the need for knowledge generation at the science-policy interface.
Focuses on positive tipping points in technology, the economy and society. It provides a framework for understanding and acting on positive tipping points. We highlight illustrative case studies across energy, food and transport and mobility systems, with a focus on demand-side solutions (which have previously received limited attention).
The political sphere may itself constitute a tipping element. In political systems, tipping can occur at the level of policy, politics or polity and involves a complex arrangement of actors (Eder and Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2023). For example, extreme events such as natural disasters or long-lasting crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic can change the political landscape by altering public perceptions and behaviour (Casoria et al., 2021), pressure on incumbents (Oliver and Reeves, 2015), and the process by which new measures are introduced (e.g. under disaster declarations), potentially opening windows of opportunity for the introduction of new policies, investments and discourse. Political regimes and policies can tip, as happened with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Kramer, 2022), as can political majorities and, ultimately, leadership. Indeed, this is one of the core principles of democracy. Leadership can change rapidly as the priorities of constituents evolve (Eder and Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2023; Yankelovich, 2006). However, while new governments may seek to quickly reverse policies introduced by prior governments, many actions, such as investments in large infrastructure projects (e.g. as needed for energy system transformation or nuclear phase-out), are characterised by strong path dependencies and lock-in of development pathways (Thacker et al., 2019) and can thus be considered nearly ‘irreversible’. This inertia built into certain infrastructures, technologies, institutions and social norms can create carbon lock-in, but also has the potential to lock in low-emissions pathways (Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2018).
An example of tipping in policy that was driven by tipping in politics is Germany’s rapid phase-out of nuclear energy following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Eder and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2023). While this example is largely negative when assessed in terms of emissions and climate goals, it is nonetheless an illustrative example of tipping in politics. In Germany, rapid changes in sentiment among the public and the governing majority (the CDU-FDP coalition in Germany) led to the rapid phase-out of nuclear energy, including the shutting down of several operating power plants. In Switzerland, in contrast, while a political majority also showed signs of tipping towards nuclear phase-out, the decision was gradual. These differences have been attributed to Germany’s ‘critical state’ prior to Fukushima, due to the public’s scepticism towards nuclear energy since the Chernobyl meltdown in 1986, and a well-established anti-nuclear movement. They also point to differences in the institutional context. In Germany, the CDU-FDP government coalition held a parliamentary majority and abruptly changed its position. Conversely, in Switzerland compromises and coalitions had to be formed in parliament to phase out nuclear energy.